Nonintrusive interrogation techniques that employ fast neutrons are of interest because of their sensitivity to light elements such as carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen. The primary requirement of a fast-neutron inspection system is to determine the value of atomic densities, or their ratios, over a volumetric grid superimposed on the object being interrogated. There are a wide variety of fastneutron techniques that can provide this information. The differences between the various nuclear systems can be considered in ligbt of the trade-offs relative to the performance requirements for each system's components (i.e., the source, target, detector array, and data processing). Given a set of performance criteria, the operational requirements of the proposed nuclear systems may also differ. For instance, resolution standards will drive scanning times and tomographic requirements, both ofwhich vary for the different approaches.
INTRODUCTION
Nonintrusive interrogation techniques that employ fast neutrons are being Studied to detect the presence of illicit substances, i.e., explosives and drugs, in luggage and cargo containers.1 Fast-neutron techniques offer the possibility ofdetermining the elemental densities, or their ratios, of several important light elements, such as carbon, oxygen, and nitrogen, based on their nuclear signatures. Explosives and drugs have unique nuclear signatures, as seen in Figure 1 . Fast-neutron techniques are intended to complement existing techniques for illicit substance detection. This paper first examines the four technical issues associated with any fast-neutron based system: (1) the fast-neutron source, (2) the nuclear signatures for the technique, (3) radiation detection, and (4) signal and image processing. Since our goal is to be able to evaluate the variety of fast-neutron techniques that are being proposed, we are developing the following tools required for these system studies. We are deriving simple analytical models to assess the ideal capabilities of a system. We are developing Monte Carlo simulation programs to look in more detail at the systems. Since each technique produces different types of signals that must be processed and analyzed, we are examining different signal processing algorithms and image processing approaches to detect illicit substances. Finally, we are developing tools that will allow the design of experiments to determine the real-world limitation ofthe techniques.
We have begun to apply our tools to the examination of two fast-neutron based systems. The first is based on detecting the neutron spectrum transmitted through the interrogated item; the technique is referred to in this paper as the Fast Neutron Transmission Spectroscopy (FNTS) technique.2 The second is based on detecting gamma rays from neutron interactions in the material being interrogated; the technique is referred to as the Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis (PFNA) technique. 3 We present some preliminary results of these studies. The ultimate goal of these studies is to determine the component requirements for each technique, identify tradeoffs imposed by system performance standards, and assess the advantages and limitations of the different techniques for various applications.
O/(H+C+N+O) Figure 1 . Two-dimensional representation of elemental compositions of explosives, drugs, and benign substances in terms ofthe normalized number densities ofoxygen and nitrogen.
TECHNICAL ISSUES

1. Fastneutron sources
Fastneutron sources can either be monoenergetic, produced by thin-target beam interactions, or polyenergetic, with a neutron spectrum characteristic of the means of production (spontaneous fission, reactor, thick4arget beam interaction, etc.). Accelerator-based sources have the advantage of being able to be turned off when not in use, and they can be pulsed to en able time-of-flight experiments or observation of capture or decay gamma radiation. Applications requiring intense neutron sources make use of protons or deuterons incident on lowZ targets such as lithium and beiyllium. Measurements' of the source strength from the Be(d,n) reaction (Figure 2) show that the yield increases rapidly with deuteron energy. The energy spectra also depend on deuteron energy, having relatively broad peaks with a sharp drop-off at E Ed -1 MeV and small tails that extend to somewhat higher energies. For Ed = MeV, the spectrum has a broad flat peak over the energy range 1-5 MeV, making it well suited for fast-neutron transmission measurements of elements with resonance structure in this energy regime. . . -. One example of a monoenergetic source is the H(&n)He reaction in a thin gas target. The cross section and neutron en ergy as functions5 of incident deuteron energy are shown in Figure 3 . A typical application using 8-MeV neutrons would require deuterons with energy of approximately 5 MeV, where the cross section is about 60 mb/sr. The yield from this reaction depends on target design.6 While a thicker target would give a greater yield, there would also be a loss of timing resolution in the neutron pulse due to the traversal time of the deuteron beam across the target and the difference between the neutron and deuteron velocities. For example, a deuteron with energy 5 MCV would take 4.5 nsec to traverse a gas target 10 cm long. Some spread in neutron energy may also be caused by deuteron-energy loss in crossing the target, depending on the gas pressure. Another monoenergetic source is based on the 3H(d,n)4He reaction. It has a larger cross section than the 2H(d,n) reaction and can produce large numbers of 14-MeV neutrons at low incident energies. The relatively low incident energy leads to simpler source design, such as realized in Sealed-tube neutron generators (STNG tubes) used in API. However, the interaction of these high-energy neutrons can yield complex gamma-my spectra which can be difficult to interpret. Also, this reaction is not useful as a neutron source for transmission studies since there are no resonances near 14 MeV in light nuclei.
Nuclear signatures
Nuclear interrogation is governed by basic nuclear processes. We are interested in the "signatures" of these processes, in particular those initiated by neutrons. There are two detection categories, neutrons and gamma-rays. The relative importance ofany process is determined by its cross section. It determines how many signature events can be expected for each incident neutron. Cross sections are determined from measurements and nuclear modelin& A useful information resource is the International Atomic Energy Agency document CINDA.7 It is preferable to use evaluated cross sections, i.e., values recommended by experts who have examined available information from the literature. Several comprehensive national files are available. The best known is ENDF,8 the U.S. file. Similar files are available from Western Europe (JEF file), Japan (JENDL file), Russia (Brond file) and China (CENDL file). The neutron energy range of interest is from thermal up to about 14 MeV for all technologies now under consideration. We are mainly concerned with fast neutrons (E,> 100 keV). There are serious deficiencies in all these ifies that affect the quality of simulations that can be performed. For example, in ENDF several important total cross sections are inadequately known. The values for chlorine seem unphysical (see Fig. 4 ). Errors are missing for oxygen and nitrogen and they are large for carbon, iron, and copper. Signatures based on neutron detection:
Total cross section: This cross section describes neutron removal from an incident beam passing through matter. For FNTS, the signature involves detecting non-interacting neutrons. Total cross sections tend to be a few barns, except at veiy low energies or in the vicinity of resonances9 Effective neutron removal cross sections are linear combinations of specific total cross sections, weighted by the elemental or isotopic densities. The total cross section is essentially devoid of stnicture for very light elements (i.e., H and He). Total cross sections of heavier elements exhibit characteristic resonance structure according to the partial reaction processes (e.g., elastic scattering, inelastic scattering, capture or transmutation reactions). Usually one considers only elemental cross sections because isotopic materials are not found in typical cargo packages. Total cross sections from 100 keV to 10 MeV for H, C, N, 0 and Cl appear in Fig. 4 . The influence of the hydrogentotal cross section can be significant. However, the unique amplitudes and shapes of specific resonances found in the heavier nuclei provide more readily detectable signatures for neutron transmission spectra. Consider the sharp solitary peak in carbon near 2. 1 MeV, a similar peak in nitrogen near 330 keV and the dramatic dip found in oxygen near 2.4 MeV (Fig. 4) . scattering. The number of states available for fewMeV neutrons is limited in C, N and 0 (e.g., the first-excited state of 12C is at 4.44 MeV10). Only neutrons with energies of several MeV can excite these elements. There is a tradeoff between having enough energy to provide yield and energies so high that the spectra are too complex. The signatures are thus very energy-dependent. There are rather severe constraints on the use of signatures from elastic and inelastic scattering for rgo interrogation. The incident neutrons must be monoenergetic and the object to be interrogated has to be thin. The desired signatures are very readily "washed out" by multiple scattering. The detectors and data recording system must provide a timing signal to yield an effective signature, even under ideal conditions.
Signatures based on gammaray detection:
Inelastic scattering: Neutron inelastic scattering provides more useful signatures when specific gamma rays are detected. Although gamma rays, like neutrons, are both scattered and absorbed in materials, gammaray signatures are more robust than those for neutrons. Incident neutron coffimation and timing lead to signatures that tell us about the location as well as presence of certain elements. To produce usable signatures, incident neutrons must exceed the energy of the first-excited states. The cross section generally becomes adequate within a few hundred keV above threshold. Neutron energies of at least 5 MeV are needed to assay carbon by this method. For oxygen, the minimum is about 6.5
MeV. Nitrogen n be detected with neutron energies as low as 2.5 MeV. Inelastic gamma-ray production cross sections are rarely known to better than 20% this and other factors limit the accuracy of elemental concentration determination. The signature quality also depends strongly on the neutron energy, cargo size, sharpness of timing signal and the chemical composition of the material. PFNA technology is based on neutron inelastic scattering.'1 API uses 14-MeV neutrons from the 3H(d,n)4He
reaction. By detecting the alpha particle (4He nucleus) assOciated with each neutron, one generates a timed and coffimated neutron beam. The sensitivity is very low and 14-MeV neutrons produce very complex gamma-ray spectra in most materials. These spectra are very difficult to interpret.
Neutron capture: Neutron capture produces gamma-rays. There are strong signatures at very low energies or in the vicinity of specific resonances (e.g., the resonan region of cadmium). The cross sections are very small for MeV neutrons, so this process is of little interest in the present context. Spatial information is hard to obtain since most of the yield comes from primary neutrons that have been scattered many times before capture. The best known application of neutron capture interrogation involves observation of prompt gamma rays from 15N produced by thermal neutron capture on 14N. The technology developed from this concept is known as 12 In other techniques capture gammas constitute a source of background radiation.
Neutron transmutation reactions: Fast neutrons can induce more complex transmutation reactions in nuclei. For example, the 14N(n,4He)1 1B reaction generates prompt gamma rays characteristic of 1B. The 160(n,p)16N reaction produces radioactive 16N which decays to 160 yielding characteristic gamma rays of this nucleus. The cross sections for these transmutation reactions are often smaller than for the other processes (except neutron capture) and they require fast neutrons. The possibilities for deriving spatial information from the interrogation are largely lost unless the gamma-rays are prompt.
Radiation detection
The conversion of the nuclear signature to a number requires that the signature interact within a detector, that the interaction produce a physical signal such as light, and that this light be convefled to an electrical signal. This electrical signal is then processed to obtain information about characteristics of the signature to determine its validity before it is counted as an event. For example, in PFNA the signature of interest is the number of gamma rays at a particular energy and the origin of these gamma rays along the thickness of the container. The energy is obtained by integrating the light from the detector over a few microseconds and feeding this integrated signal, which is proportional to energy, to a counter that stores the number of counts as a function of energy. The position information is obtained by doing time-of4light betweenthe interacting gamma ray and the accelerator pulse and correlating this position information with the energy information. In FNTS, the signature OfintereSt is the neutron energy, which is obtained by time-of4light
The important characteristics of the detectors are the efficiency in detecting the nuclear signature, the amount of light pro-' duced by the signature interacting in the detector, and the decay time of the light output which determines how accurately the timing can be measured in time-of-flight measurements. The characteristics of the signal processing system are its s_ and accuracy in processing the electrical signal. Information on radiation detectors and signal processing can be foundinRef. 13.
For the energy range of neutrons being considered, the timing resolution of the neutron detector depends mainly on the thichiess ofthe detector rather than the decay time of the light interaction. For a 2-MeV neutron and a timing resolution of 1 ns, the thickness should be on the order of 2 cm. The size of the photomultiplier affects the timing resolution because large photomultiplier tubes have poor timing resolution. Large photomultiplier tubes are also expensive. The typical efficiency for a 2-cm-thick neutron detector with a neutron threshold of 0.5 MeV is 20%, with a timing resolution of better than 1 nsec.
In general, gamma-ray detectors have a slower decay time than neutron detectors. However, this is not usually a limitation if one is also doing energy measurements at the same time, except in the case of large germanium detectors which have timing resolutions approximately a factor of 5to 10 worse. A concern with gamma-ray detectors is obtaining both energy resolution and detection efficiency in the same detector at a reasonable cost. While the overall intrinsic efficiency (probability of detecting a gamma ray) is high, the probability of this detected gamma ray depositing all of its energy in the detector (photopeak fraction) is relatively small. For the inorganic Na! scintillator the intrinsic efficiency is approximately 60%, while the photofraction is 0.28 for a 10-cm diameter by 10-cm thick detector at 5 MeV. Thus the actual detector efficiency is approximately 17% for 5-MeV gamma rays. Other inorganic scintillators such as BGO and CaF2 becoming more widely used because of their better photopeak efficiency, but cost and energy resolution may limit their performance. Solid state germanium detectors have excellent energy resolution, but their efficiency is considerably worse than that of the inorganic detectors because of size limitations, especially as the energy of the gamma-ray increases.
Signalprocessing
The final component of the interrogation system is concerned with processing the signal produced by the detector into an indicator of the presence or absence of an illicit substance. This basically involves (1) correcting the measured counts for effects such as scattering or beam hardening, (2) converting the signal counts into a qualifier of the illicit substance such as number density, and (3) combining the signal with those from other detectors, other views, and possibly other interrogation techniques to determine the presence of illicit substances.
Corrections
Scattered radiation produces signals at the detector output that do not come from signatures originating in the interrogated voxel. The subject of scattering has not been seriously addressed in the various detection systems, especially those in which there are a large number of incident beams and/or detectors. The magnitude of the scattering impacts illicit substance detection in two ways. The first is due to the statistics of the detection process in which the error in the true signal is proportional to square root of the true signal plus the scattered signal. Thus, in large complex systems in which the transmission is less than a few percent, the scattered component must also be below a few percent. Even for relatively small systems in which the average transmission is typically 30 to 50%, scattering can be a problem because transmission through a book or other heavy object can be less than a few percent. Statistically, scattering can be overcome by increasing the data collection time, thereby increase the number of counts collected by the detector. The second effect of scattering is more important in systems which attempt to quantitatively determine the presence of illicit substances by directly measuring number densities. Scattering introduces a systematic uncertainty in the derived densities of the illicit substance, which can mask the differences between qualifiers for different substances. Other corrections, such as those for beam hardening and overall normalization, must also be considered. If these effects are dealt with inadequately, the fidelity of the qualifier is compromised and the reliability of substance identification suffers.
Oualifiers
The quantity that is measured experimentally in FNTS, PFNA, or x-ray techniques is the linear interaction coefficient, t(j), wherej refers to neutron or x-ray energy in the case ofFNTS and x-ray techniques, and the gammaray energy in the case of PFNA. Detection of illicit substances uses these measured j) to define a qualifier that separates illicit from benign substances. The term qualifier is used to refer to the functional relationship involving &(j). The simplest qualifier is the value oft(j)for a spccificj. Ifthere is more than onej value, then a qualifiercouldbe defined that is some linear combination of the (j)'s. A still more complicated qualifier is one that uses some combination of jt from a x-ray interrogation system and t from a neutron interrogation system. Once a qualifier is chosen, then constraints are imposed on the subsequent system design requirements. The optimization and integration of qualifiers and system design constraints are areas of research that need to be expanded.
To quantify the concept of qualifier, consider a region of the container containing a compound J with an interaction coeffident pt, a compound density p. and molecular weights of the individual elements W, ad W, The linear attenuation coefficient for this region is
where NA is Avogadro's number, A1 is the atomic weigbt of element i, and a(j) is the interaction cross section, which is a function of the parameter j. The quantity Nx P W 15 the atom density of the element x averaged over the region Ax being interrogated.
The dependence of t on the densit)' of the compound is a significant prthlem in separating illicit and benign substances. A simple way to eliminate this density dependence is to measure jt for two different values of the parameter j, and to define a qualifier that is the ratio ofthese two jt's. Optimization of this qualifier in FNTS can be done by selecting the energies used.
A different approach to eliminating p is to again measure j at two different parameters of j and solve the linear set of equations for the number densities N and N. The quantities N and N are, in a sense, intermediate qualifiers, which still depend on &nsiy, but which provide some initial screening information. A linear combination of these number densities, however, defines a new qualifier that is independent of density. Note that while the ratio of the number densities is the simplest choice, other combinations could provide a better separation of illicit and benign materials.
A key assumption in the preceding development is that the region being interrogated contains only the compound of interest. In the case of mixtures ofcompxinds, it is still possible to eliminate the densit)r ofthe compound mixture, as in the case of a single compound, but now the qualifier will depend on the amount and type of the other compound. Thus it is important to keep the region being interrogated small. Since simple shadowgraph systems sample the entire thickness of the container being inspected, their sensitivity is limited by the presence of other compounds. This need to measure i& over a small volume to avoid the interfering effect of other compounds suggests that a multiple-view system will be required.
System Information
In an ideal world a single detector would produce a single qualifier that would indicate the presence or absence of an illicit substance. In the real world this is not possible, so one must obtain additional pieces of information and then pross this additional information to determine the presence or absence of illicit materials. Since obtaining additional information will almost always lead to additional complexity and cost, it is in the interest ofthe system designer to minimize what is required without compromising the accuracy of the result. Exactly what additional information is needed has not really been explored even for a single qualifier. Two key questions are the volume resolution required and the number of projectional views of the inspected object that will be needed since they will have a significant impact on system cost and complexity. In resolving these issues it is necessaiy to note that one is interested only in the binazy question of whether an illicit substance is present. This is in some sense an easier question to answer than if one is interested in determining quantitative amounts. It should also be noted that the answer to the resolution and projection question is strongly tied to the qualifier chosen. Another question is whether the use of an x-ray scan could provide additional information that might reduce the number of neutron projections required. This is a useful question because the cost of x-ray systems is less than that for neutrons. This area of system integration needs the most attention in model development.
ANALYTICAL MODELS
Simple analytic models that use realistic assumptions about the radiation source, the source/detector geometiy, and the interaction, detection, and analysis processes contribute physical insight into the issues surrounding candidate nuclear interrogation systems. These models give an important first look at concepts to determine whether or not further detailed investigation is warranted. Two such models are described below. One describes son Statistical considerations in determining changes in the linear attenuation coefficient, and the other deals with some effects of detector count.rate limitaüons on system design.
1 StatiStical considerations for required neutron fluence
In FNTS, the ultimate limit on image quality arises from the statistics ofthe counting process. Reference 14 shows that the neutron fluence 1, in n/cm2, required to detect a change u in the linear attenuation coefficient within a small voxel of area 6A and thickness T is D= 2SNR2e/ (_Li
Here D is the thickness of the object being inspected, s is the efficiency of the neutron detector, SNR is the required signal- refers only to the effects of statistics on the image quality. Thus the effect of scattering from a Statistical point of view is to increase the required incident flux. Systematic effects of scattering, however, can introduce uncertainties, which are significantly larger. Also, while an equation similar to Eqn. 2 holds for tomographic reconstruction15, artifacts due to the reconstruction process can introduce larger uncertainties.
The required neutron flux for PFNA or similar systems can be derived in the same way as that of Eqn. 2. In this case the equation is given by = SNR2e1nL1+1yL2
(_J_). Finally, assuming that D is 10 cm and F is 0.5 gives b=1.8.1o8/(b7'&4). For a volume of 1 cm3 the incident flux requirements for PFNA will be approximately a factor of 300 times higher than for FNTS, while for a volume of 1 mm the incident flux will be only 30 times higher. It should be noted that the increased flux requirements for PFNA can be offset to some extent by increasing the solid angle of the detector. Also, PFNA provides 3dimensiona1 information, which will require multiple projections with FNTS.
Implications ofcount-rate limits for system design
As an example of limitations imposed by detector constraints, consider a FNTS system for examining luggage. Typical system parameters may include an array of detectors each 10 cm in diameter at a source-detector distance of 500 cm, source and detector timing widths of 2 nsec, an average transmission of 0.3, and an average detector efficiency of 0. 1. Under these conditions, neutrons in the energy range 0.540 MeV arrive at flight times of 100 to 500 nsec. A source repetition rate of at most 1 MHz should be used to avoid wraparound. Assuming that each detector is limited to a counting rate of iO n/sec, during the active period a detector can receive at most 40,000 counts each second, which would be the result of reaction at Ed MeV, the source strength is 1.87 '1012 n/sr/mC, leading to an average current of 7 p.tA or a peak current of about 3.5 mA. This current would cause a peak heating in the target of 17.5 kW, with an average heating of 35 W.
Looking at these same figures another way, over a ten second period each detector would accumulate 400,000 counts distributed over roughly 200 time bins. if these counts are distributed uniformly, there would be 2000 counts per bin on the average. The uncertainty due purely to counting statistics would be on the order of 2.2%; the uncertainty will be greater when the effects of background, noise, scattering, etc., are included. Bins containing fewer than the average number of counts (i.e., corresponding to the high-energy tail) will have poorer statistics.
Models of this type indicate some interesting results. For example, if one moved the detector array back to a distance of 10 m to improve energy resolution, the detector solid angle would decrease by a factor of four and the range of neutron arrival times would be a factor of two longer. Thus one would need a source that was a factor of eight stronger to maintain the same detector count rates. However, the pulse repetition rate would have to be cut in half to avoid wrap-around (since the neutron flight times are twice as long) so that in a ten-second period only half as many counts would be accumulated. In addition, both peak and average target heating would be higher. Moving the detectors in to 250 cm would reduce source strength requirements and allow a faster pulse repetition rate, but at a sacrifice in energy resolution.
MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
Following the application of simple models to investigate a candidate interrogation concept, subsequent analysis should treat more accurately the source characteristics, physics of the transport and interaction processes, detector efficiency, statistical uncertainties and noise in the detected signal, and the procedures for data analysis and substance identification. Monte Carlo transport codes such as MCNP,'6 which follow individual neutrons and photons from the source through the system to their detection, escape, or capture, are ideal for this type of analysis since they combine the simplicity, flexibility, and power needed to conduct investigations of basic physics questions surrounding candidate nuclear techniques. Insights to experiments and proof-of-principle systems are easily obtained since those changes (such as source strength or source/collimator/detector configurations) which make Monte Carlo statistics better (or worse) can be related to the corresponding measured quantities. In addition, the flexibility of Monte Carlo codes to specify sources, geometries, etc., allows the investigation of design tradeoffs for candidate systems far more easily, quickly, and inexpensively than an experimental design program.
Two approaches can be taken to modeling systems with Monte Carlo codes. One can attempt to predict the response of the system with the smallest fractional error by using an array of powerful variance reduction techniques such as the weight window and exponential transform. This is sometimes the only approach one can take, especially in optically thick media such as represented by cargo containers. An alternative is to use pure analog transport, in which each neutron from the source represents exactly one neutron from a real source in an experimental or test geometiy. This is generally possible only in optically thin media, such as checked baggage. By incorporating realistic physical parameters, including detector efficiencies, one can arrive at results for which the fractional errors are equivalent to what one would expect in the realworld system. Having errors of the proper magnitude and variation across phase space is important in testing analysis and decision-making procedures that use the data. Some of the parameters involved in such an analysis can be predicted using analytic models, which allows an interplay between several ofthe tools described herein.
1 Fast-neutron transmission spectroscopy
Preliminary results have been obtained using MCNP to model a FNTS system. The neutron source is taken to be the forward-directed neutron energy spectrum from the Be(d,n) reaction at Ed MeV (see Figure 2) , with the time dependence a 2-nsec square wave. The source-detector distance is 500 cm, with the sample placed midway between in a tightly collimated geometiy. Neutrons arriving at the detector are binned in 2-nsec wide intervals. Analog particle transport was used for these cases (i.e., no variance reduction). The number of histories was chosen using the analytic model of Section 3.2 to correspond to an irradiation time of ten seconds. An example of transmission ratios (the ratio of counts with the sample in to counts with no sample in each bin) for a typical explosive material (RDX) is given in Figure 5 . The data for the time bins are analyzed for element areal density (nuclei/cm2) using standard nuclear analysis techniques'7 adapted to the method of effective variance,18 as described in Section 5. The cross section data used in the inversion procedure were obtained by modelling transmission experiments, choosing an average transmission of 0.3 to minimiZe errors in the calculated cross sections.19 Elemental concentrations are expressed in terms of ratios, since in a transmission measurement of this type the sample thickness would not be known, so that one could not determine the absolute number densities of the elements. Figure 6 . These qualifiers are chosen since almost all common materials encountered in these investigations will have at least one of these elements, so that the chance of getting a zero denominator is small. This set of qualifiers also showed good discrimination between explosives, drugs, and benign materials (see Figure 1) . Figure 6(a) shows the results of a number of repeated calculations of neutron transmission for the same material and thickness in order to investigate the reproducibility of the inversion scheme. Included in this figure are the 1-a curves for each analyzed point. These curves show the locations of points that lie one standard deviation away from the center. These data show that the inversion scheme is robust in the sense that the qualifiers for all the data sets lie close to the true point. Figure 6 (b) 1-a plots for fast-neutron transmission through varied thicknesses of RDX. The 1-plot shows the curve of points located one standard deviation from the center. The probability that the point is contained within a 1-a curve is 39.3%; for a 2-a curve (not shown) the probability is 86.5%. 
An example of these results in terms of the qualifiers N/[H+C+N+O] and O/[H+C+N+OJ is shown in
Pulsed fast-neutron analysis
The results presented for FNTS were for a tightly collimated geometiy, so that scattered neutrons were not included. Some effects of neutron scattering are examined here for the case of PFNA, which has been described above. In this technique, localization of information about elemental concentrations is provided in directions transverse to the beam by sour collimation. Localization along the beam direction is obtained by timing the total flight times of a source neutron and a detected ganuna ray from inelastic scattering. For this timing to be possible, the inelastic events would have to occur only along the beam axis. The effect of neutron scattering would be to scatter high-energy neutrons out of the beam axis, so that gamma-ray signals might originate from other regions ofthe sample being interrogated.
Several MCNP cases were nm for a 50-cm radius cylinder consisting of a single bulk material. The cylinder was 78 cm long, which corresponds to a 20-nsec flight time for 8 MeV neutrons. Neutrons were injected at one end along the cylinder axis. The cylinder was subdivided into ten 7.8-cm slices (2-nsec flight time), and the inelastic scattering rates from lowlevel excited states of carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen were taffied in each slice and in 2-nsec wide time bins. With the tally bins set up in this way, the source neutrons would be in the first slice during the first time bin, in the second slice duringthe second time bin, etc. Thus for proper timing of the neutron + gamma-ray paths, the inelastic gamma signal should be highest in the first slice during the first time bin, highest in the fifth slice during the fifth time bin, and so on. Figure 7 shows the inelastic scattering rate for '2C(n,n1) (4.44-MeV level) vs. depth into the cylinder and for times between 12 and 20 nsec. Data for 16()(p,p,) (6. 13-MeV level) are shown in Figure 8 . If we examine the central core of radius 10 cm, we see that the inelastic scattering rate, and hence the inelastic gamma rate, peaks in the last slice of the cylinder as desired. However, if one looks at the entire cylinder, the inelastic scattering rate peaks at a shallower depth than desired, which would not preserve the timing accuracy required for imaging. This indicates that collimated detectors, on the opposite face of the sample from the source, may be required to preserve the proper timing infonnation. The reduced count rate for the collimated detector would actually help since the gamma rays being rejected would be those originating in parts of the sample that are not being interrogated, and would just be contributing background and noise. These inelastic events are created by neutrons that scatter out of the incident beam and traverse the material at an angle, so that they do not penetrate to the same depth in a given time as those which remain in the incident beam.
Another point of interest is that the desired peaking is preserved better for oxygen that for carbon, for both collimated and uncollimated signals. This is a direct result of the relationship between the incident energy and the threshold energy for inelastic scatter. Since the threshold energy is farther below the incident energy for carbon, neutrons can experience more scattering events, suffering greater departures from the incident direction, and still retain sufficient energy to undergo inelastic scattering from carbon but not from oxygen. Inelastic scattering results from nitrogen (not shown here) support this conclusion. The inelastic scattering rate from a particular level is better correlated with the incident neutron "wavefront" for higher-energy excited states. Gammas resulting from the excitation of the first (2.3 1 MeV) and second (3.98) excited states in nitrogen may not be able to provide the proper timing information. On the other hand, the 0.72-MeV gamma that results from a transition between the sixth (5.83 MeV) and fourth (5. 1 1 MeV) excited states in nitrogen could provide better timing information because of the higher threshold energy. Detection could be problematic for an element like chlorine, which has many low-level excited states lying close together.
Reduction of the incident neutron energy to 7 MeV would result in a large loss of signal for oxygen, and would only marginally improve timing for carbon and nitrogen. A higher neutron energy, such as that provided by the 3H(d,n) reaction (14 MeV), would not only lead to more complex gamma spectra but would also involve more neutron scattering before passing the inelastic thresholds. On the whole, 8 MeV appears to be a nearly ideal choice for incident energy.
SIGNAL AND IMAGE PROCESSiNG
This section is concerned with how to make decisions about the presence of illicit substances from neutron interrogation of luggage and cargo. Characteristics ofthe subsystems and algorithms used to process the measurements depend on the type of measurements and choice of qualifiers; however, the approach developed to test various detection schemes must be general enough to apply to all the choices being considered. For example, the signal processing requirements for PFNA do not include a tomographic step, because (in the absence of additional scattering) detection of the gamma ray produced in the primaiy interaction provides localization information.
A simplified flow chart for illicit substance detection based on FNTS is shown in Figure 9 . Here, it is assumed that the projected species densities or species qualifiers are first determined and then the spatial distributions of these quantities are obtained by tomography. This order is not necessarily the optimum order in which to perform the processing. For example, one might prefer to perform tomography on projected linear attenuation coefficients measured at a few discrete neutron energies and then obtain qualifiers for a few suspicious volumes. Thus, one function for the tools discussed in this section is to test which order is optimum for signal and image processing from the stand point of accuracy of the final results.
For illicit substance detection schemes based on neutron transmission, one must develop and test both algorithms to map measured attenuation coefficients along a few lines of sight to areal densities (or qualifiers constructed from these densities)
and image reconstruction algorithms that can perform tomography with a few projections. The effectiveness of the substance detection scheme must be tested under conditions that include effects of scattered neutrons. For schemes based on inelastic scattering with detection of the emitted gamma rays, with or without simultaneous detection of the scattered neutron, one's tools must be able to test the effect on the results of gamma rays originating within the voxel under interrogation and gamma rays produced outside the voxel but scattered into the detector. The basic FNTS data are transmission measurements along lines of sight. From these measurements, the basic signal processing algorithms mentioned in Section 2.4 yield linear attenuation coefficients, which are functions of neutron energy, elemental species densities and species atomic numbers. Mapping of these results to areal species densities or qualifiers is accomplished by least-squares inversion algorithms. In addition to areal species densities, these algorithms yield covanance infonnation from which one can construct confidence limits for the densities. Qualifiers can then be computed from the areal densities. Figure 6 shows typical results of inverting Monte Carlo simulated transmission data with our current species inversion algorithm.20 This algorithm is based on procedures that were developed for earlier nuclear data programs.17 Since both the measured linear attenuation coefficients and the cross sections used to invert areal species densities from these data have uncertainties, the inversion process is based on minimization of the effective variance.18 Questions to be investigated with this and related tools include (1) effect of scattering on the uncertainties of the areal densities, (2) choice of inversion inputs to minimiZe vulnerability to systematic errors, and (3) efficacy of constrained linear inversion algorithms.2' Addition ofa trial function constraint to the present inversion algorithm would yield a related tool to permit testing whether the qualifier mapping procedure would benefit from using an initial trial function based, for example, on a homogenized distribution of substances expected in a typical piece of luggage or cargo. Other constraints (e.g., positivity) could also be implemented. Previous experience in another field has shown that iterative constrained The spatial distribution of suspicious substances is determined by a reconstruction scheme similar to industrial tomography. Computed Tomography (CT) involves constructing image slices of a three-dimensional object from a series of one-dimensional pmjections thtained from multiple line-of-sight transmission measurements. Medical tomography demands resolution on the order of 1 mm but such high resolution for a substance detection scheme may not be necessary.
Typically, resolution on the order of 1 cm should be adequate for substance detection. Consequently, tomography algorithms capable of testing the use of few projections should be developed, and the relation between the number of views, the choice of substance qualifiers, and the accuracy of the final decision call (illicit substance present or absent in a particular voxel) should be tested with these tools.
Crewe and Crewe showed that as few as four views are sufficient for inexact tomographic reconstruction24 if the areal species density maps or substance qualifier maps can be reduced to binary arrays. Specifically, they showed that a matrix of binary numbers can be reconstructed to sufficient accuracy from four projections: vector sums along the horizontal, vertical, and two diagonal directions. They also showed that the error in the reconstruction saturates at about 25%as the size ofthe matrix increases. Later, they constructed tomographic images of a hemoglobin molecule from scanning electron microscopic measurements along the three orthogonal view directions plus a fourth view at 45 degrees with respect to the two horizontal view directions.25 The data were reduced to a 32x32 array of binary numbers for each 2-dimensional view; thus, the volume of the entire object was represented by 32 locations Each horizontal row of data in the four views was taken to represent a slice of the molecule projected onto the appropriate plane, and the reconstruction algorithm of their previous paper was employed. Similar image reconstruction algorithms should be constructed to test whether three or four views are sufficient for substance detection tomography. Inputs to these algorithms would be binary maps of qualifiers (on or off) projected on planes determined by the directions ofthe transmission lines of sight The use of detenninistic models and/or Monte Carlo simulation is an effective way to assess a concept's viability and to spot strengths and weaknesses. Still, there is a need to benchmark such studies with selective experiments. This does not require building a full-scale prototype system. Rather, certain Critical aspects of the system ought to be mocked up and tested by measurements that are realistic but focused on specific issues.
First, no computational model can ever incorporate all the minute features of a physical system. Practical models focus on the key issues and overlook others. Otherwise, model parameterizations would be excessively cumbersome and computation times so long that one would not be able to learn about the critical features of the system in a reasonable amount of time. Nevertheless, certain details can be important. If key features of the model are missing the results can be misleading. Experiments designed to test the behavior of the system at Critical junctures in the development process can give the necessary feedback to avoid serious mistakes. Another feature of experiments is that they provide calibration of a method's sensitivity. While numerical analysis gives such information too, the results are wholly dependent upon validity of the parameters introduced and the way they are used. Due to parameter uncertainties and method deficiencies the true sensitivity of a concept may diverge considerably from calculated values. As an example, we can turn to reactor physics where clean benchmark critical assemblies are used to validate reactor calculations. The criticality constant and the true neutron spectrum can be determined experimentally and compared with Monte Carlo or detenninistic transport calculations.
Benchmarking experiments are relatively inexpensive and can often be carried out on existing facilities, for example research accelerator facilities found at universities or national laboratories. Such a study is the work of Overley and coworkers on the neutron transmission technique to measure elemental concentrations.26 A collimated beam of neutrons produced by Be(d,n) reactions is transmitted through various materials. Time-of-flight techniques are employed to provide energy sensitivity, and the data lead to knowledge ofH C, N and 0 in the samples. These experiments provide a good test of the total cross section data base and show how such considerations as the pnmaiy neutron source spectnim and its intensity impact on Statistical accuracies that can be obtained in practice. The impact of timing resolution is also reflected in these data in a manner that is possible to demonstrate only approximately by simulations. A similar approach appears in the work by Sawa and coworkers.11 These experiments measure C, N and 0 content of materials by detecting gamma rays from nuclei excited by neutron inelastic scattering. Spatial information is derived by using pulsed neutrons and associated timing signals.
CONCLUSIONS
Our examination ofthe technical issues (fast-neutron sources, nuclear signatures, radiation detection, and signal and image processing) has shown that there are many tradeoffs that will be involved in the design ofa useful fast-neutron based interrogation system. Any system will possess not only a set ofcapabiities, but also a set of limitations. We have begun the development ofa set of tools to determine these for proposed systems. Simple analytical models are valuable for performing scoping calculations. Detailed modelling based on Monte Carlo simulations is needed because realistic analysis ofa system involves complex neutron and gamma-my transport considerations. The Viability ofa system is veiy dependent on the success ofthe signal and image processing approaches. For most systems, this is one ofthe most technically challenging areas. We conclude that it vill often be necessaiy to do benchmark experiments before committing to the construction of a costly, complete system. Our preliminaiy analyses of two representaüve fast-neutron based systems, FNTS and PFNA, have shown the need for a comprehensive set oftools if one is to correctly assess the advantages and limitations of different systems for various applications. 
